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“A DR. STRANGELOVE SITUATION”:  
NUCLEAR ANXIETY, 
PRESIDENTIAL FALLIBILITY, 
AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Rebecca C. Lubot* 
 
This Article is a revisionist history of the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, which establishes procedures for remedying a vice presidential 
vacancy and for addressing presidential inability.  During the Cold War, 
questions of presidential succession and the transfer of power in the case of 
inability were on the public’s mind and, in 1963, these questions became 
more urgent in the shadow of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Traditional legal 
histories of the Amendment argue that President John F. Kennedy’s 
assassination was both the proximate and prime factor in the development of 
the Amendment, but they do not account for the pervasive nuclear anxiety 
inherent in American politics and culture at the time.  Oral interviews of key 
actors, such as former Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, the Amendment’s 
architect, as well as examination of the Lyndon B. Johnson papers, the files 
of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, and other previously 
unexamined archives, offer new insight into the anxiety and thought 
processes of the President, Congress, and state legislators.  With the 
ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment on February 10, 1967, the 
nuclear anxiety of the era became ingrained in the Constitution itself.  The 
framers of the Amendment adjusted America’s foundational document not as 
dictated by a momentary whim but by the exigencies of the times.  With the 
goal of expanding the field of legal history by examining cultural and 
political factors, this Article argues that nuclear anxiety provides another 
important explanation for the incorporation of the Amendment. 
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the Presidency:  Gaps and Solutions held at Fordham University School of Law, is dedicated 
to the memory of my father, Dr. Eric S. Lubot.  For an overview of the symposium, see 
Matthew Diller, Foreword:  Continuity in the Presidency:  Gaps and Solution, 86 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 911 (2017). 
 
1176 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1176 
I.  NUCLEAR ANXIETY IN CONGRESS ...................................................... 1180 
A.  “This Is the Time to Do It”:  Legislative Precursors, 1958–
1963 ...................................................................................... 1180 
B. “He and He Alone Has the Authority to Push the Vital 
Button”:  Drafting and Passage Through Congress, 1963–
1964 ...................................................................................... 1182 
C.  “The Nightmare of Nuclear Holocaust” and “the Potential 
of Paralysis” Require Us “to Act—and To Act Now”:  
Passage Through Congress, 1965 ........................................ 1187 
II.  NUCLEAR ANXIETY IN THE STATE LEGISLATURES, 1965–1967 ........ 1192 
A.  “Let Us Not Rush Pell-Mell down the Road to Madness”:  
Ratification in Pennsylvania ................................................. 1192 
B.  “The Possibility of a Simultaneous Death of All in the Line 
of Succession Is a Nuclear Age Reality”:  Ratification in 
Arkansas ................................................................................ 1193 
C.  Nuclear Anxiety and Presidential Continuity “Are Not 
Unrelated in the Thoughts of the Public”:  Ratification in 
Colorado ............................................................................... 1194 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1197 
INTRODUCTION 
“This is a true Dr. Strangelove kind of situation,”1 Senator Birch Bayh, 
principal author of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, said to his fellow 
Congressmen when assessing the outcome of the first invocations of the 
Amendment.  The 1964 film, Dr. Strangelove or:  How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Bomb,2 dramatized an inconceivable event, a nuclear 
catastrophe, with black humor.3  Dr. Strangelove depicted a scientist—an 
individual in a field Americans loved to trust—who had become “strange,” 
or gone insane.  By invoking the popular film, Bayh pointed to Cold War 
anxieties about the collision of military and scientific power, as the film 
focused on the ability of the President who wielded that power.  The Twenty-
Fifth Amendment was designed to secure the line of presidential succession 
in cases of disaster such as a sudden strike and, at the same time, prevent a 
 
 1. Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment:  Hearing on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 154 (1975) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  
 2. DR. STRANGELOVE OR:  HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB 
(Columbia Pictures 1964). 
 3. The fact that Dr. Strangelove is listed on the National Film Registry of the Library of 
Congress underscores the plot’s enduring cultural significance. Complete National Film 
Registry Listing, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/programs/national-film-preservation-
board/film-registry/complete-national-film-registry-listing/ [https://perma.cc/365B-XBXW] 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
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President who had become crazy or mentally unstable from controlling the 
bomb. 
From the nation’s founding until the mid-1940s, questions of presidential 
succession tapped into deep-seated anxieties about the durability of 
democratic government, and specifically whether it could withstand the 
threats posed by disruptive, unplanned changes to the nation’s highest 
office.4  Following the United States’ use of atomic bombs against Japan at 
the end of World War II, those anxieties took on a new gravity.  As the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists stated, “Merely by existing,” nuclear 
weapons “have already set off chain reactions throughout American society 
and within every one of its institutions.”5  The Bulletin recognized that 
nuclear anxiety—defined here as the “fear of nuclear war and of its 
consequences”6—had become a staple of American popular and political 
culture but was also difficult to quantify.  In response, the Bulletin designed 
the “Doomsday Clock” in 1947 as a gauge of how close mankind is to 
destroying itself, with midnight representing the apocalypse.7  The President 
had the Zeus-like power to destroy entire nations and snuff out millions of 
lives with the press of a button in an instant; all other powers were trivial by 
comparison. 
At the same time that Congress granted this cosmic authority solely to the 
President with the 1946 Atomic Energy Act,8 Congress was debating what 
would become the Presidential Succession Act.9  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
sudden death brought attention to succession and inability issues at the dawn 
of the nuclear age.10  The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 clarified the 
line of succession beyond the Vice President by amending an 1886 act—the 
last action on the succession issue—to make the Speaker of the House third, 
ahead of the President pro tempore.11  Both the President and Congress 
deemed a congressional line of succession more democratic than the Cabinet 
line of succession—which was in place at the time—because the Speaker is 
elected by the people of his district and then chosen by his cohort.12  
 
 4. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 132–133, 141, 144 
(2005). 
 5. PAUL BOYER, BY THE BOMB’S EARLY LIGHT:  AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CULTURE AT 
THE DAWN OF THE ATOMIC AGE xvii (1994) (quoting Robert Karl Manoff, The Media:  Nuclear 
Security vs. Democracy, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan. 1984, at 29). 
 6. Tom W. Smith, Nuclear Anxiety, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 557, 557 (1988). 
 7. Kennette Benedict, Doomsday Clockwork, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clockwork8052 [https://perma.cc/4JP3-QWBN]. 
 8. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 9. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-829, at 1–2 (1945). 
 10. Succession to the Presidency:  Hearings on S. Con. Res. 1, S. 139, S. 536, and S. 564 
Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 80th Cong. 6 (1947) (statement of Sen. Theodore 
Francis Green, Member, S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.) (noting the “renewal of the discussion 
[of presidential succession] since the death of President Roosevelt”). 
 11. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
 12. In a June 19, 1945, statement to Congress, President Truman wrote, “[T]he office of 
the President should be filled by an elective officer. . . .  I believe that the Speaker is the official 
in the Federal Government whose selection, next to that of the President and Vice President, 
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Truman’s Presidential Succession Act became law in 194713 and the Soviets 
exploded their first atom bomb just two years later. 
After the developments of more powerful bombs by the United States and 
the Soviet Union and a method to deliver them with the Soviet launch of 
Sputnik in 1957, nuclear anxiety began to spur government officials in 
Congress and in the Eisenhower administration to solve the presidential 
inability problem, which had been elusive since the Constitution’s 
ratification.  Eisenhower and Nixon signed a letter agreement, which was 
released to the public on March 3, 1958, under the specter of the arms race.14  
In the letter, the President and Vice President agreed that the Vice President 
would assume presidential powers in the event the President declared himself 
unable to perform his duties.15  If the President was not in a position to 
declare himself unable to perform his duties, the Vice President, after 
consulting with whomever he deemed appropriate, would make the 
determination of inability.16  In either case, the President would determine 
when the inability had ended and his powers would be immediately 
restored.17  No President or Vice President in U.S. history had come to such 
a public agreement before Eisenhower and Nixon.18  Their public 
acknowledgement of the possibility of an incapacitated President suggested 
that the conversation about the need for a clear chain of command had 
become urgent.  President John F. Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson signed a similar letter on August 10, 1961,19 reflecting that even the 
youthful Kennedy must have been anxious about ensuring the orderly transfer 
of power in the nuclear age. 
Heightened tensions between the superpowers during the Kennedy 
administration—in particular, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 
1962—focused policymakers and the public on the possibility that the 
President might be forced to decide the fate of millions in a matter of mere 
minutes.20  This created an urgency for a more permanent solution to 
presidential succession and inability issues.  Even if total annihilation did not 
occur, a nuclear attack could suddenly destabilize the American government; 
 
can be most accurately said to stem from the people themselves.” H.R. REP. NO. 79-829, at 1–
2. 
 13. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified as 
amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19). 
 14. Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to Procedures in the Event 
of Presidential Disability, PUB. PAPERS 196 (Mar. 3, 1958). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 178–79 (1962). 
 19. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary (Aug. 10, 1961) (on file with 
the National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments). 
 20. See, e.g., Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President:  
Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 92 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearing] (statement 
of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary) (discussing the possibility of “the Russians mov[ing] missiles into Cuba” after 
the President has become incapacitated). 
2017] A DR. STRANGELOVE SITUATION 1179 
structural and procedural safeguards were needed to guard against this 
possibility.  Nuclear anxiety flourished even more intensely after Kennedy’s 
assassination.  The specter of a nation without firm leadership during a time 
of nuclear crisis ultimately provided the impetus to resolve these succession 
issues. 
The nuclear issue made the sudden transition from Kennedy to Johnson 
different from other unexpected presidential successions.  Although seven 
other Presidents had died while in office and sixteen Vice Presidents had also 
died before completing their tenure, Kennedy was the first President to die 
instantaneously—fatally wounded by an assassin’s bullet.21  Kennedy’s 
immediate death, coupled with Johnson’s presence in the same motorcade 
where Kennedy was shot, highlighted the long-standing concern that the 
passage of power to the Vice President might not always be smooth.22  
Kennedy’s assassination resulted in a sudden transfer of power to a Vice 
President whose own health was subject to question.23 
For this reason, traditional legal histories, such as that of David Kyvig, 
have argued that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, though a product of “long-
standing concerns about presidential disability and succession,” was most 
immediately “a reaction to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.”24  
Yet the assassination does not fully explain the Amendment’s sinuous 
journey through Congress and its ratification almost four years after 
Kennedy’s death.  For a more complete account, the climate of nuclear 
anxiety evident in culture and politics from 1945 through 1967 must be 
factored into the gradual ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
Bayh’s determination to alter the Constitution to solve this issue reflected 
the widespread belief that the American public and its government could no 
longer tolerate a potential absence at the helm during this era of nuclear 
apprehension.25  Because the President wielded the power of the bomb, he 
literally had the power of life and death and the continuity of mankind in his 
hands—something that never could have been imagined by the framers of the 
Constitution.  In the midst of the growing nuclear anxiety, Eisenhower’s brief 
illnesses and Kennedy’s sudden death exposed the paradox that the President 
was at once powerful and mortal.  Asked years later if tense international 
confrontations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and nuclear anxiety were in 
the back of his mind as he began drafting what later became the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, Bayh replied:  “I think it was impossible for it not to be on the 
forefront, not the back of [my] mind.”26  The Cuban Missile Crisis “was very 
 
 21. STEVEN M. GILLON, THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION—24 HOURS AFTER:  LYNDON B. 
JOHNSON’S PIVOTAL FIRST DAY AS PRESIDENT 56–57 (2009). 
 22. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS:  AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 357 (1996).  In Explicit and Authentic Acts, David Kyvig 
engages in the debate over whether the Constitution continues to serve as the “sovereign will 
of the people as to the terms of their governance” or whether it is unable to “check[] the 
momentary whims and excesses of transitory holders of power.” Id. at xviii. 
 23. Johnson suffered a heart attack in 1955, the same year as Eisenhower. Id. at 358. 
 24. Id. at 349. 
 25. Telephone Interview with Birch Bayh, former U.S. Senator from Ind. (Nov. 11, 2014). 
 26. Id. 
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much a reason” for the Amendment, he said.27  Bayh perceived that the 
framers had not anticipated the effects of nuclear weaponry on the 
presidency, and this, coupled with the fallibility of any individual President, 
most likely led him to conceive that the time was right for an Amendment to 
address presidential succession and inability. 
From December 1963, when Bayh introduced his draft of the Amendment, 
through its ratification in February 1967, references to Kennedy’s 
assassination lessened during congressional debate,28 but direct and indirect 
allusions to the nuclear anxiety that permeated American culture and politics 
continued.29  It was this nuclear anxiety that contributed to each stage of the 
process.  But while the urgency of concern about presidential stability amid 
the real possibility of instant nuclear destruction directly contributed to 
ratification, it also complicated the process of ratification in states such as 
Pennsylvania, Arkansas, and Colorado.30  Despite contrary reactions to the 
prospect of nuclear destruction, after more than two decades at the forefront 
of America’s psyche, nuclear anxiety became part of the framework of 
American government. 
I.  NUCLEAR ANXIETY IN CONGRESS 
 This Part describes the legislative precursors to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, its drafting, and its passage through Congress.  Throughout the 
process that ultimately led to ratification, nuclear anxiety permeated the 
discussion and informed decision-making. 
A.  “This Is the Time to Do It”:  
Legislative Precursors, 1958–1963 
A year after the Sputnik launch and shortly after Eisenhower and Nixon 
signed their letter agreement, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, 
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments, made it clear he believed the time had come to pass inability 
and succession legislation.  In April 1958, Kefauver introduced a bill on 
presidential succession, which embodied the spirit of the letter agreements 
with few modifications.31  He reintroduced the bill in the 86th Congress.32  
Both times, the Chairman was able to move the bill out of his subcommittee 
to the wider Judiciary Committee, but no further.33  Congress adjourned in 
1960 with the legislation still on the Committee’s agenda. 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. See generally 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 20. 
 29. See infra Parts I.B–C, II. 
 30. See infra Part II. 
 31. See BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND 
SUCCESSION 26 (1968) (noting that this “administration proposal” was similar to the March 
1958 letter agreement, but it “contain[ed] modifications that were designed to allay 
congressional criticism”). 
 32. S.J. Res. 40, 86th Cong. (1959). 
 33. See BAYH, supra note 31, at 27. 
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Then, in 1962, Kefauver announced that he would join Republican Senator 
Kenneth Keating of New York to cosponsor a bill, Senate Joint Resolution 
35 (“S.J. Res. 35”), which was endorsed by the American Bar Association 
(ABA).  The bill “simply authorize[ed] Congress to pass laws on how to 
decide when a President is disabled,” or, in other words, enabled Congress to 
establish procedure.34  The thrust of the release was that “[t]his is the time to 
do it—when we have a young, healthy President, when extensive hearings on 
this subject would not be embarrassing to anyone.”35  A healthy President 
would not take succession planning as a slight; legislating a solution had 
become imperative. 
On June 11 and 18, 1963, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments held hearings on presidential succession and inability bill S.J. 
Res. 35.36  The bill was less detailed than many pieces of legislation pending 
in the Subcommittee; it was drawn up that way in the hope that Congress 
would be more inclined to pass a less complicated piece of legislation.37  It 
had the tacit support of former Vice President Richard Nixon, who 
experienced firsthand the issues involving an incapacitated President when 
Eisenhower was ill.38  Nixon wrote to Kefauver before the hearings began:  
“With the advent of the terrible and instant destructive power of atomic 
weapons, the nation cannot afford to have any period of time when there is 
doubt or legal quibbling as to where the ultimate power to use those weapons 
resides.”39  Pointing to the “constitutional defect” in his opening statement, 
Senator Keating agreed with the former Vice President:  failing to take action 
in this era could result in “paralysis” at the very time that quick and cogent 
decision-making was imperative.40  With these fears in mind, the 
Subcommittee as a whole came to that conclusion as well and the bill was 
voted out of the Subcommittee to the full Judiciary Committee.41 
On August 10, 1963, two weeks after his sixtieth birthday, Kefauver died 
of a heart attack42 and the hope of a more solid succession and inability plan 
almost died with him.  Senator James O. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, considered dissolving the panel.43  Yet a memorandum 
written in round cursive handwriting on Senate letterhead in the last of 
 
 34. Press Release, Estes Kefauver, U.S. Senator from Tenn., Memo from Washington 
(Jan. 28, 1963) (on file with the National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments).  
 35. Id. 
 36. Presidential Inability:  Hearings on S.J. Res. 28, S.J. Res. 35, and S.J. Res. 84 Before 
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1–
117 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Senate Hearings]. 
 37. BAYH, supra note 31, at 54–55. 
 38. See NIXON, supra note 18, at 131–81. 
 39. Letter from Richard Nixon, former Vice President, to Estes Kefauver, U.S. Senator 
from Tenn. (June 10, 1963) (on file with the National Archives and Records Administration, 
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments).  
 40. 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 11 (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, 
Member, Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 41. BAYH, supra note 31, at 346. 
 42. Estes Kefauver Is Dead at 60 After Heart Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1963, at 1. 
 43. KYVIG, supra note 22, at 358. 
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Kefauver’s files noted, confidentially, that presidential disability had 
“prospects [at] this time.”44  Concomitantly, Senator Bayh and his staff were 
searching for their own opportunities to resolve the succession and inability 
issue, hoping to fill the void Kefauver’s death created.45  Bayh convinced 
Chairman Eastland to make him the new Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments46 and on September 30, 1963, the Judiciary 
Committee ratified his appointment.47 
B. “He and He Alone Has the Authority to Push the Vital Button”:  
Drafting and Passage Through Congress, 1963–1964 
Kennedy’s sudden death elicited calls for legislation to remedy the 
confusion surrounding presidential succession and inability; these calls were 
coupled with references to the tense cultural and political mood of the era and 
the potential for nuclear war.  “Has the Congress prepared the Presidency 
adequately for the possibilities of a violent age?” James Reston, columnist 
for the New York Times, asked on December 5, 1963.48  He continued, “Is the 
rule of Presidential succession satisfactory for these days of human madness 
and scientific destruction?”49  Similarly, a Washington Post editorial insisted 
that the problem of presidential succession “need[ed] a fresh analysis” 
because “[i]n these days of hair-trigger defense few things would be more 
perilous than uncertainty as to where the powers of the Presidency would lie 
in case of disaster.”50  These articles motivated Senator Bayh.51 
Senator Bayh had been thrust into a centuries-old constitutional 
conundrum.  On December 4, 1963, after listening to debate in a Judiciary 
Committee meeting that focused mainly on other matters but included 
references to the succession bill that Kefauver and Keating had introduced 
earlier in the year, Senator Bayh decided to draft his own measure.52  During 
the second week of December, the Senator gathered his team and began the 
herculean undertaking.  John D. Feerick, author of a paper entitled “The 
Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?,” published 
in the Fordham Law Review in 1963,53 was an integral member of this team.  
Feerick became the Chair of the American Bar Association’s Junior Bar 
Conference Committee on Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential 
 
 44. Memorandum from Estes Kefauver, U.S. Senator from Tenn. (July 1963) (on file with 
the National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments). 
 45. See BAYH, supra note 31, at 28–29. 
 46. Telephone Interview with Robert Keefe, former Admin. Assistant to U.S. Senator 
Birch Bayh (Nov. 5, 2014). 
 47. BAYH, supra note 31, at 29. 
 48. James Reston, The Problem of the Succession to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
1963, at 34. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Editorial, Presidential Succession, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1963, at A20. 
 51. BAYH, supra note 31, at 10, 32. 
 52. Id. at 29, 31–32. 
 53. See John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve 
It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 73 (1963). 
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Vacancy in the spring of 1964.54  He made it the Junior Bar Conference’s 
mission to garner further support for a presidential succession and inability 
amendment.55  Other members of the American Bar Association, including 
Dale Tooley and Michael Spence, were instrumental in conducting the 
campaign—in Congress, among state legislatures, and with the public—to 
get presidential succession and inability measures written into the 
Constitution.56 
In his book One Heartbeat Away, Bayh wrote that the vice presidential 
vacancy following Kennedy’s assassination and President Johnson’s 
assumption of the presidency created urgency for proposing succession and 
inability legislation.57  But in his speech on December 12, 1963, on the floor 
of the Senate, Bayh made no mention of the assassination.58  Significantly, 
Bayh referred to the increased pace of communications and technology (and 
therefore warfare) in the modern era of globalization and concluded that the 
tense international atmosphere called for immediate action:  “The accelerated 
pace of international affairs, plus the overwhelming problems of modern 
military security, make it almost imperative that we change our system to 
provide for not only a President but a Vice President at all times.”59  The 
following month, Bayh highlighted the increased importance and 
responsibilities of the Vice President during the Cold War.60  In later 
testimony, members of the public and Congress amplified Bayh’s point:  even 
if it had not been the case in the past, now, during the atomic age, having a 
successor at all times was vital to the nation’s security.61 
Nuclear anxiety was a key motivating factor driving the amendment 
forward from the outset.  As Bayh got to work with his team to perfect his 
first draft, he reflected that, for the sixteenth time in U.S. history, the nation 
was without a Vice President but that “this was a different and dangerous 
age.  The possible consequences of inaction were . . . terrifying . . . .”62  
Senator Bayh introduced Senate Joint Resolution 139 (“S.J. Res. 139”) on 
December 12, 1963.63 
Concerns at this time emphasized a perceived weakness in the 1947 
succession law:  the potential for the presidency to switch parties suddenly 
during the nuclear age.  In its statement on national policy entitled 
Presidential Succession and Inability, the Committee for Economic 
 
 54. J. William Cuncannan, Our Younger Lawyers, 50 A.B.A. J. 505, 573 (1964). 
 55. Interview with John D. Feerick, Dean Emeritus, Norris Professor of Law, Fordham 
Univ. Sch. of Law, in Larchmont, N.Y. (Feb. 28, 2016). 
 56. See infra Part II.C. 
 57. BAYH, supra note 31, at 34. 
 58. 109 CONG. REC. 24,420–21 (1963) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 59. Id. at 24,421. 
 60. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearings on S.J. 
Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1–2 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch 
Bayh, Chairman, Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
 61. See infra notes 69–88 and accompanying text. 
 62. BAYH, supra note 31, at 34. 
 63. 109 CONG. REC. 24,420 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
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Development (CED), a public policy think tank, suggested eliminating 
Congress from the line of succession to avoid a potential sudden switch in 
parties.64  In the CED’s proposal, the Secretary of the Treasury would be 
third in line behind the Vice President and Secretary of State, thus removing 
the Speaker of the House and Senate President pro tempore from the 
succession line, as put in place by the 1947 law.65  Notably, the proposal 
pointed out the President’s unique position in that he must keep his finger on 
the nation’s nuclear trigger and provided, “As Constitutional commander in 
chief of the military services, the President controls both the nuclear trigger 
and the use of all other military force” and that “[t]he President’s active 
leadership is so essential to the effective operation of the government that his 
death or serious illness . . . creates the risk of national disaster.”66  The 
proposal underscored the urgency of finding a solution to presidential 
succession and inability because of the power the President had at his 
fingertips. 
Bayh invited star witnesses who understood the urgency firsthand to testify 
at the Subcommittee hearings that began on January 22, 1964.67  Former 
President Eisenhower—whom Bayh believed was “the only person alive that 
could adequately describe the need for an inability amendment”68—did not 
appear in person but agreed to submit a statement for the record.69  In that 
statement, Eisenhower pointedly did not suggest that the letter agreements 
signed by himself and Nixon in 1958 would suffice to solve the succession 
and inability problem.70  Instead, he said that the “bothersome” possibility of 
a disaster removing the President and Vice President simultaneously meant 
that changes should be made by constitutional amendment.71 
Testimony from across the aisle was rife with similar remarks that nuclear 
war was a grim possibility, and, as such, the United States required an 
 
 64. COMM. FOR IMPROVEMENT OF MGMT. IN GOV’T, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., PRESIDENTIAL 
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 69. Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower, former President of the U.S., to Birch Bayh, 
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immediate solution to the succession and inability problem.  Republican 
Congressman Louis C. Wyman of New Hampshire stated that a “crippling 
inability is a daily possibility with any President” and concluded that 
Congress must act because “in this atomic era seconds can be crucial.”72  
Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York stated, “The split-second 
exigencies of this nuclear age do not permit the luxury of further incomplete 
solutions.”73  And Senator James B. Pearson, Republican of Kansas, argued 
that “[i]n an era when defense of the entire free world, through the use of our 
nuclear deterrents,” relies on just one man, the President, “we cannot leave 
any doubt about the fact of succession or the capabilities of the President’s 
successor.”74  The letter agreement between Kennedy and Johnson of August 
10, 1961, was included in the testimony.75  The agreement concluded that 
“[o]bviously,” not having a plan in place “is a risk which cannot be taken in 
these times.”76  By early 1964, the voices calling for action were building.77 
One expert witness, Professor Ruth Miner of Wisconsin State College, was 
insistent that a solution was needed because of the tense public mood of the 
era.  Due to her concern that an atomic attack would occur when all officials 
in the line of succession were in Washington, D.C., Miner suggested that the 
line after the Vice President include state Governors.78  These Governors 
would be chosen in the order of their states’ population.79  Yet the Governors 
who testified did not discuss Miner’s succession idea.  Governor Edmund 
Brown of California said that it “would be tragic, in this day of nuclear 
weapons when foreign policy decision[s] literally can mean life or death, not 
to provide the machinery in all contingencies for a sure and smooth transition 
of executive power.”80  Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York 
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echoed Brown’s sentiments and stated that the present arrangements did “not 
adequately cope with the nation’s needs at a time of international crisis and 
tension when the ‘hot line’ to Moscow might have to be used on short notice 
by the nation’s Chief Executive.”81  Like the other witnesses, these 
Governors argued that the 1947 Act was inadequate in light of nuclear 
anxiety. 
The only witness to eclipse Rockefeller’s star power, former Vice 
President Richard Nixon, was even more adamant than in his earlier letter to 
Senator Kefauver that the existence of atomic weapons made it imperative to 
ratify an amendment.  After stating that the President was the defender of the 
free world, Nixon continued:  “The United States and the free world can’t 
afford 17 months or 17 weeks or 17 minutes in which there is any doubt about 
whether there is a finger on the [nuclear] trigger . . . .”82  Nixon also made 
the case in an essay for the Saturday Evening Post:  “Fifty years ago the 
country could afford to ‘muddle along’ until the disabled President either got 
well or died.”83  He continued, “But today when only the President can make 
the decision to use atomic weapons in the defense of the Nation, there could 
be a critical period when ‘no finger is on the trigger’ because of the illness of 
the Chief Executive.”84  To Nixon, who had actually been in the presidential 
line of succession, the lack of planning for such a crisis was unacceptable. 
Perhaps nobody knew the flaws in the succession process as intimately as 
President Johnson himself.  Johnson had not provided any support during the 
Subcommittee hearings and he forced Bayh to incorporate an earlier letter of 
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, dated June 18, 1963, 
into the record in hopes that critics of his succession and inability bill would 
not make note of the administration’s silence.85  Katzenbach had expressed 
support for the Kefauver-Keating succession legislation prior to Bayh’s 
introduction of S.J. Res. 139.86  Bayh knew that Katzenbach’s main reason 
for supporting the earlier bill could also be applied to S.J. Res. 139.87  “The 
primary purpose,” the Deputy Attorney General said, “is to confer broad 
discretion on the Congress” when the President and Vice President disagree 
on inability “or an atomic attack or like holocaust prevents communication 
and agreement between the President and Vice President.”88  Despite fears 
of a chaotic transfer of presidential power in the nuclear age, Johnson 
recognized that some members of the House would not vote favorably for 
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S.J. Res. 139 out of respect for House Speaker John McCormack, who was 
next in line due to the vice presidential vacancy created by Johnson’s 
accession to the presidency.89  Johnson relayed this inclination to Bayh in 
late March 1964 after the hearings were finished.90 
Two months later, on May 27, 1964, S.J. Res. 139 was reported out of the 
Subcommittee to the full Senate Judiciary Committee.91  The Congressional 
Quarterly noted that the Senate Subcommittee had approved a measure that 
“would provide a means of filling Vice Presidential vacancies, unsolved 
problems of paramount importance in a push-button-war age, in the opinion 
of some.”92  With Johnson’s advice in mind, Senator Bayh was content to see 
the Judiciary Committee unanimously pass S.J. Res. 139 on August 4, 
1964.93  Weeks later, on September 29, 1964—about five weeks before the 
presidential election and only days before Congress adjourned for the 
campaign season on October 3—the Senate approved the bill by a roll call 
vote of 65 to 0.94  Bayh now intended to “introduce the amendment at the 
beginning of the following session, pass it rapidly through the upper 
chamber, and bring [the] entire effort to bear upon the House of 
Representatives.”95  Heightened nuclear anxiety would allow him to do just 
that. 
C.  “The Nightmare of Nuclear Holocaust” and “the Potential of 
Paralysis” Require Us “to Act—and To Act Now”:  
Passage Through Congress, 1965 
Bayh felt that the administration’s support was crucial to passage.  Because 
of lobbying by Bayh and the ABA, President Johnson dedicated eighteen 
words to the succession and inability issue in his State of the Union address 
on January 4, 1965:  “I will propose laws to insure the necessary continuity 
of leadership should the President become disabled or die.”96  On January 28, 
1965, after additional lobbying, Johnson officially endorsed Bayh’s 
amendment (Senate Joint Resolution 1 (“S.J. Res. 1”) and House Joint 
Resolution 1 (“H.J.R. 1”) in the new 89th Congress) by sending a message 
of support to Congress, which emphasized that a nuclear holocaust or other 
such catastrophe required planning in the form of an amendment.97  Johnson 
contended that, thanks to providence, America had avoided a chaotic transfer 
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of presidential power.98  But, he said, “[I]t is not necessary to conjure the 
nightmare of nuclear holocaust or other national catastrophe to identify these 
omissions as chasms of chaos into which normal human frailties might 
plunge us at any time.”99  He continued, “The potential of paralysis implicit 
in these conditions constitutes an indefensible folly for our responsible 
society in these times.  Commonsense impels, duty requires us to act—and 
to act now—without further delay.”100  Highlighting the tense cultural and 
political mood, Johnson urged that “[a]ction on these measures now will allay 
future anxiety among our own people—and among the peoples of the 
world . . . .”101  With his finger not only on the trigger but on the pulse of the 
nation, the President was clearly prompting Congress to act before nuclear 
disaster struck.  The President’s support proved effective when, on February 
1, 1965, S.J. Res. 1 was reported favorably to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments and, three days later, 
the Judiciary Committee approved the resolution, sending it to the entire 
Senate.102 
The same week the Senate Judiciary Committee approved S.J. Res. 1, the 
House Judiciary Committee held its own hearings on February 9, 10, 16, and 
17, 1965.103  The testimony was replete with references to nuclear anxiety as 
the reason for moving forward with an amendment.104  Convening the 
hearings, House Judiciary Chairman Emanuel Celler did not mention the 
tragic death of the late President in his opening statement.  Instead he stated, 
“One would have to be blind not to see and acknowledge the dangers” the 
nation was gambling with by not having a solution to the important 
problem.105  Celler listed the duties of the president and argued that the nation 
could not leave the office unfilled, even briefly, because of these 
responsibilities in the nuclear age.106 
Bayh was one of the experts who testified before the House Judiciary 
Committee and mentioned a nuclear nightmare.  He began by discussing time 
limits, focusing on the number of days that might elapse between the 
nomination and confirmation of a Vice President.107  Bayh shared the 
thoughts of the Senate Judiciary Committee and posed a nuclear holocaust 
scenario:  “What if we were engaged in nuclear war and the seat of 
Government is destroyed?  There would be a time element involved finding 
a place where the Congress could meet and convene despite rapid travel we 
take for granted.”108  Nuclear war could cause numerous problems for 
presidential continuity—not the least of which was convening Congress to 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1548. 
 102. See BAYH, supra note 31, at 346. 
 103. See generally 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 20. 
 104. Id. 
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 108. Id. at 67.  
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determine a President’s inability if the President and Vice President 
disagreed—but predicting the hardships that would come in the aftermath of 
a nuclear attack was difficult. 
When discussing the issue of time limits—a point of contention when 
ironing out the differences between the Senate and House versions of the 
bill—Congressmen made numerous references to the perils and anxiety of 
the nuclear age.  Colorado Congressman Byron G. Rogers, a member of the 
House Judiciary Committee, raised the issue by referencing the earlier CED 
report of the need to include provisions for dual presidential and vice 
presidential inabilities.  He stated that the CED “finds a need to change the 
present posture we are in because of the nuclear age” and that “it is 
conceivable, though remote, that some situation like [dual inability] might 
occur.”109  Focused on the specter of nuclear war, Democratic Congressman 
Abraham J. Multer of New York reminded the committee about the unease 
surrounding President Eisenhower’s illnesses, saying, “I need not document 
the circumstances of these occasions, for we can all recall the danger that can 
be sensed when a President is incapacitated, particularly in the nuclear 
age.”110  Howard W. Robison, another Representative from New York, 
suggested not only ratifying an amendment but including a statute to specify 
additional procedures in the event of disability.  One of the provisions 
Robison stipulated was a commission with the responsibility to declare the 
President incapacitated.  He said, “I feel the latter contingency is important 
in view of the perilous nuclear-threatened world in which we live.”111  In 
another statement, California Congressman Edward R. Roybal, expressing 
his support for H.J. Res. 1, also tied the need for the amendment to the nuclear 
age:  “I am sure that the members of this committee fully realize that we can 
no longer afford, in this nuclear-space age, to leave the fate of or Government 
to the whims of chance.”112  Talk of time limits continued to pivot on the fact 
that Congress would be making the decision on inability in an age when 
minutes mattered. 
On February 19, 1965, Bayh introduced S.J. Res. 1 on the floor of the 
Senate.113  In his speech on the Senate floor, Bayh listed the crises America 
was dealing with when Eisenhower had his heart attack in 1955 and then read 
a pertinent section of Nixon’s Six Crises aloud.114  This underscored the fact 
that it was the President’s job to react to these situations and that it was he 
who had his finger on the nuclear button.  In the section Bayh read, Nixon 
had written:  “The ever-present possibility of an attack on the United States 
was always hanging over us.  Would the President be well enough to make 
the decision?  If not, who had the authority to push the button?”115  The 
principal author of what would become the Twenty-Fifth Amendment not 
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only pointed numerous times to nuclear attack as the reason for urgent 
passage but was now highlighting the nuclear anxiety of the former Vice 
President, who was once first in the line of succession.  The Senate passed 
S.J. Res. 1 by a vote of 72 to 0 on February 19, 1965.116 
After the Senate delivered S.J. Res. 1 to the House, Congressman Celler 
again iterated the sentiment that, because the President’s finger was on the 
nuclear trigger, Congress could not ignore the danger inherent in failing to 
enact Bayh’s resolution.  The Congressman said, “One would have to be 
blind not to see and acknowledge the danger and the risk we are faced with 
at this very moment . . . .”117  Celler’s statement echoed that of Johnson’s 
January 28 endorsement—while fate had been kind to America in that 
Kennedy had not lingered incapacitated, which perhaps would have caused a 
chaotic transfer of presidential power, Congress could not expect America’s 
luck to hold out.118  Celler noted that the resolution had the support of the 
ABA and reread earlier testimony into the record.119  The House passed a 
modified version of S.J. Res. 1 by a vote of 368 to 29 on April 13 and returned 
the bill to the Senate on April 22.120 
When the House returned the bill to the Senate on April 22, moderate 
changes had been made to limit the time in which Congress had to decide the 
President’s disability.121  Bayh used the nuclear issue to sway the decision-
making.  The House had added the provision that if Congress did not declare 
within ten days that the President was incapacitated, he would resume 
office.122  Bayh disagreed with this change and commented that, although he 
was not a doctor, time for diagnoses and discussion would be needed.123  He 
would “bet there are some illnesses which can’t even be diagnosed in ten 
days, let alone permitting enough time for congressional discussion.”124  
After a ten-day period, Congress could still be weighing the evidence and 
“we might have a President who could be completely off his rocker 
reassuming his powers and duties, even if it meant he could blow us all to 
kingdom come in an hour’s time.”125  Bayh had again invoked the nuclear 
specter as a main argument, this time for the Senate not to cave to the House. 
One other time-related difference remained between the Senate and House 
versions.  In the House version, Congress was required to convene within 
forty-eight hours to discuss the President’s inability, and Bayh, yet again, 
brought up the possibility of nuclear attack.126  Congress convening in that 
last instance would only occur if the President and Vice President had 
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disagreed about the President being disabled.127  On this point, Bayh stated, 
“If we’re hit by an atomic attack and the Capitol building is destroyed, it 
might take more than forty-eight hours for Congress to convene.”128  The 
resolution moved forward in both chambers for the same reason—a strong 
belief that something needed to be done to provide for smooth transitions 
during the nuclear age—and the differences were hammered out successfully 
in conference committee.129 
Going into the final vote, Bayh was nervous that the amendment would not 
pass,130 but leveraging the nuclear issue likely helped see the bill through.  In 
his final floor speech, Bayh concluded that during other times in history, it 
may not have mattered if a competent President was at the helm in times of 
crisis, but due to the possibility of nuclear war, the succession and inability 
amendment had to be passed now.  Juxtaposing the period before the bomb 
with the current era, Bayh stated, “[T]oday, with the awesome power at our 
disposal . . . when it is possible actually to destroy civilization in a matter of 
minutes, it is high time that we listened to history.”131  The amendment would 
ensure “a President of the United States at all times, a President who has 
complete control and will be able to perform all the powers and duties of his 
office.”132  After his speech that once again emphasized the dangers of the 
nuclear era, the amendment passed the Senate on July 6, 1965, by a roll call 
vote of 68 to 5.133 
In the end, nuclear-attack provisions were not written into the amendment 
submitted to the states for ratification,134 but concerns about such an attack 
clearly affected the language and structure of the amendment as passed by 
Congress.  The words of the framers of the amendment, Congressmen, and 
expert witnesses illustrate that this nuclear anxiety was an underlying cause 
precipitating passage.  Because passage was urgent, some of the 
suggestions—such as provisions to deal with the fact that those in the line of 
succession were located in Washington, D.C.,135 directions in the case of dual 
disability of the President and Vice President,136 and the establishment of a 
commission to help determine what constitutes “inability”137—were not 
addressed by the amendment.  But Congress had recognized the need for an 
immediate solution in the nuclear age, and, by the summer, the proposed 
amendment went to the states for ratification.138 
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II.  NUCLEAR ANXIETY IN THE STATE LEGISLATURES, 1965–1967 
Ratification by three-fourths of the states was now all that remained for the 
amendment to become part of the Constitution, but the amendment’s success 
was not guaranteed.  Following passage in the Senate, Bayh and the ABA 
immediately launched a campaign to get the necessary thirty-eight states on 
board.139  Eventually, thirteen states would ratify the amendment in 1965, 
eighteen in 1966, and the final seven states in January and February of 
1967.140  While some states ratified quickly and without issue, political and 
cultural tensions determined the amendment’s success in others.141  The 
potential need for practical application of what had originally been an 
academic interest of Feerick’s became obvious when President Kennedy’s 
sudden death drew nationwide media attention.  But that reason was not 
emphasized as the amendment made its way through the states.  Instead, state 
legislators framed their opinions on the amendment based on the anxiety 
around nuclear attack.142 
This Part focuses on three states in which nuclear anxiety was particularly 
evident—Pennsylvania, Arkansas, and Colorado.  On the floor of the 
Pennsylvania House of Representatives, the possibility of nuclear conflict 
was cited as the reason for immediate ratification and why partisan politics 
had to be overcome.143  Conversely, in Arkansas, the amendment’s lack of 
detail pertaining to a nuclear attack was criticized and briefly held up the 
amendment’s progress.144  In Colorado, previously unexamined 
correspondence between Colorado State Senator John R. Bermingham and 
members of the ABA reveal Bermingham’s pleas that specific provisions be 
written into the amendment to deal with a nuclear crisis.145 
A.  “Let Us Not Rush Pell-Mell down the Road to Madness”:  
Ratification in Pennsylvania 
In Pennsylvania, the proposed amendment passed through both houses of 
the legislature and through two additional readings before it was met with 
delays due to concerns about the nuclear era.  The cause of the amendment’s 
pause was a lone representative, Philadelphia Democrat Eugene Gelfand, 
whose party controlled the statehouse.146  Gelfand, perhaps unaware of the 
scrutiny and debate the amendment had undergone at the federal level, argued 
against ratifying Bayh’s amendment too quickly without careful 
consideration.147  But Gelfand’s colleague, Republican Representative G. 
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Sieber Pancoast of Montgomery County, urged the Pennsylvania state 
legislature to back the amendment.  During the floor debate, Pancoast argued 
that invoking the inability provisions—specifically the proposed section 4, 
which allowed the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet to declare the 
President incapacitated—might lead to a power struggle within the executive 
branch, a struggle that was unacceptable for any “length of time in our atomic 
age.”148  Gelfand, who spoke next, argued that though anxious times called 
for action, the house still should not vote in haste, stating, “I know the tenor 
of the times is to do something, but let us not rush pell-mell down the road to 
madness just for the sake of doing something, because it could mean 
disaster.”149  The amendment was not brought to a vote.150 
The ABA believed that not ratifying the amendment would be a disaster 
and worked diligently to convince Pennsylvania legislators to move forward 
with ratification.151  It mobilized federal, state, and local bar associations, as 
well as other members of the Pennsylvania legislature, to put pressure on 
Gelfand to allow the process to move forward.152  Gelfand did not mention 
the ABA’s pressure, but in a matter of weeks, Pennsylvania became the fifth 
state to ratify on August 18, 1965.153 
B.  “The Possibility of a Simultaneous Death of All in the Line of 
Succession Is a Nuclear Age Reality”:  Ratification in Arkansas 
In Arkansas, Bayh and the ABA also encountered a holdup.  Bayh’s 
personal appearance at the National Governors’ Conference in July had 
helped bring Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus on board.154  After the 
conference, Bayh and Faubus exchanged letters.  In a letter dated August 5, 
1965, Faubus stated that he had hoped that Congress would pass the 
amendment while Arkansas had been in special session, but now it did not 
seem likely that Arkansas would ratify before the Arkansas legislature 
convened next.155  However, Representative Paul Van Dalsen disseminated 
a copy of an article by Professor George D. Haimbaugh that had appeared in 
the South Carolina Law Review, entitled “Vice Presidential Succession:  A 
Criticism of the Bayh-Cellar [sic] Plan,” which criticized the amendment’s 
lack of specific provisions to deal with a nuclear attack.156  In the article, 
Haimbaugh cited the possibility of a nuclear crisis and the effect it would 
have on succession, thus criticizing the amendment for not adequately 
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addressing these issues.157  Significantly, he wrote, “Arguments in favor of 
the Bayh-Celler plan for vice presidential succession also include a ritual 
reference to the dangers of the thermonuclear age.”158  He continued, “The 
possibility of the simultaneous death of all in the line of succession is a 
nuclear age reality, but the Bayh-Celler plan does not meet this danger.”159  
Haimbaugh suggested that the amendment was not useful because it granted 
Congress powers it already had, including the power to designate successors 
to the presidency that would not be affected by a nuclear attack on 
Washington, D.C.160  He argued that under Article II, Congress has “the 
power to extend the line of succession to include high ranking officials who 
work outside the Washington area.”161 Despite Haimburgh’s criticism, 
Arkansas ratified the proposed amendment on November 4, 1965.162 
C.  Nuclear Anxiety and Presidential Continuity 
“Are Not Unrelated in the Thoughts of the Public”:  
Ratification in Colorado 
The amendment began to pick up steam in the states; however, the 
ratification process in Colorado threatened the amendment’s overall success.  
In a letter to Feerick on July 21, 1965,163 ABA member Dale Tooley included 
a letter he had written to the editor of The Denver Post, in which Tooley 
addressed an article from the day before, entitled “Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
Has Serious Defects.”164  Tooley stated that although the paper originally 
supported the Colorado legislature’s passage of a memorial resolution and 
asked Congress in February 1965 to move forward on the amendment, the 
Post had reversed its earlier position and was now opposed to the 
amendment.165  One notable point of the Post’s article was that the 
amendment did not deal directly with vice presidential inability.166  What if 
both the President and Vice President were simultaneously unable to serve?  
The Post argued that this was a dangerous omission because a coherent 
Commander in Chief was needed when seconds mattered in the nuclear era:  
“In a nuclear age, the presidency must be occupied at all times by a man in 
full possession of his faculties.”167  In Colorado, it looked like a lack of 
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specifics around vice presidential inability during the nuclear age might 
prevent ratification. 
Colorado State Senator John R. Bermingham also worried about the 
proposal’s failure to contend with a nuclear catastrophe.  Once a supporter 
and now opposed, Bermingham’s concerns also made the Colorado 
newspapers.168  In his first letter to the ABA dated August 10, 1965, 
Bermingham made clear that he wanted provisions explicitly written into the 
amendment in case of a nuclear crisis.169  He questioned “why no provision 
was included in the proposed Amendment to cover the situation that would 
occur if an atomic bomb wiped out the entire city of Washington while all 
our high officials were present.”170  And he wondered, “How would the 
government get started again?”171  He would continue this focus on the lack 
of detail in the event of a nuclear attack for months. 
Michael Spence, Tooley’s assistant, responded to Bermingham ten days 
later and noted that Bermingham was not the only one to have raised 
questions about whether the succession and inability amendment addressed 
nuclear attack.  Spence stated that although the drafting committee did 
consider that possibility, the amendment “could not cover every possible 
situation which might be imagined.”172  The amendment was designed to deal 
only with problems “which history has indicated might be likely to 
reoccur.”173  He went further by stating that the amendment “does not deal 
with the subject of atomic holocaust specifically” but admitting that “[t]he 
occurrence of atomic destruction under any circumstance would be 
chaotic.”174  He concluded by saying that the proposed amendment would 
not cause problems during such events.175 
This was not the assurance that Bermingham wanted.  He wrote again to 
Spence stating that the huge sums spent annually on defense against atomic 
attack were proof that the nuclear issue was an important one.176  
Bermingham concluded his letter by asking more pointedly why the 
amendment could not cover an atomic attack:  “Do I interpret your remarks 
correctly in concluding that our laws make no provision whatsoever for 
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continuity or succession in our government [in the event of an attack]?”177  
He continued:  “Is there any reason why the succession law could not be 
amended to cover an atomic holocaust?”178  Bermingham’s salient points did 
not take into account the fact that if the amendment was redrafted to include 
any provisions for a nuclear attack, it would have to start again at the 
beginning in a congressional subcommittee. 
In reply, Michael Spence said that Section I of Article 2 of the Constitution 
allows Congress to legislate on succession and that to provide for 
“contingencies such as the atomic holocaust you suggest[],”179 succession 
law could be amended in the future; but this response did not fully satisfy 
Bermingham.180  Spence—attempting to drive a wedge between the two 
issues that legislators at both the federal and state levels saw as intricately 
linked—added that the problem of an atomic holocaust was separate from the 
problems the amendment addressed.181  Bermingham, however, emphasized 
the importance of the nuclear issue to the public and that it was Congress’s 
duty to legislate on both.182  Bermingham wrote, “Nevertheless, they are not 
unrelated in the thoughts of the public and it seems to me that Congress has 
as much duty to take action with respect to the one problem as the other.”183  
At this point, Bermingham did not continue the battle to add language to 
cover a nuclear attack. 
Bermingham could have stalled the amendment in Colorado, similar to 
what happened in Pennsylvania and Arkansas, but on January 27, 1966, the 
ABA sent cards to every member of the Colorado legislature asking that they 
support ratification.184  In addition, Bayh’s office dictated a defense of the 
amendment that was distributed by the ABA to each member the following 
week.185  The ABA feared a domino effect; if the amendment was not ratified 
in Colorado because the language was deemed deficient in some way, other 
states might block ratification as well.186  Yet after intense focus on the 
nuclear issue, Colorado ratified the amendment on February 3, 1966.187  
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Additional states rapidly fell into line.188  Whether these state legislators were 
for or against the addition of specific language in the amendment that would 
prepare the country for the possibility of a sudden presidential transition 
during a nuclear war, virtually every last one was in agreement that a 
permanent solution was needed to solve the succession and inability issue 
because of that possibility.189 
CONCLUSION 
With the thirty-eighth state’s ratification,190 the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
became part of the U.S. Constitution on February 10, 1967, three years, two 
months, and six days after Bayh drafted the legislation.191  Nuclear anxiety 
was ingrained in the Constitution itself even as the Constitution continued to 
take shape based on the needs of the era.  Although the Amendment in its 
final form did not contain specific procedures in the event of nuclear attack, 
Congress attempted to strike a balance between including enough detail to 
provide a reassuring answer to the succession and inability problem and, at 
the same time, allowing flexibility should unforeseen events occur.  As 
references to the sudden transition from Kennedy to Johnson faded into the 
background, nuclear anxiety remained at the forefront of political discourse 
at the federal and state levels. 
Examining the legislative process through the lens of nuclear anxiety 
reveals new facets of the Amendment’s path to ratification unavailable 
through more traditional accounts that omit the cultural and political mood 
or attribute the anxiety that helped propel the Amendment’s ratification 
solely to President Kennedy’s assassination.  For a richer understanding of 
the reasons behind the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, nuclear 
anxiety must be taken into account. 
We still live, as President John F. Kennedy said, “under a nuclear sword 
of Damocles . . . capable of being cut at any moment by accident or 
miscalculation or by madness.”192  The historical patterns revealed by this 
study of the intersection of nuclear anxiety and presidential continuity 
indicate that as nuclear tensions rise, government activity around the search 
for solutions to succession and inability problems will intensify (though we 
are less likely to see the inability provisions—Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment—invoked in cases of “madness”).193  The continuity of the 
institution of the presidency is of greater importance than any one man, and, 
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as a recent report of the Fordham University School of Law’s Clinic on 
Presidential Succession points out, the remaining “gaps that persist . . . must 
be addressed because mass [nuclear] catastrophe, illness, or some other 
happenstance can occur at any time.”194  The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 
reminds us:  “the Clock ticks.”195 
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